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Abstract
In this thesis, we investigated how sociometric information can be used to improve
different methods of aggregating dispersed information. We specifically compared four
different approaches of information aggregation: vanilla opinion poll, opinion polls
where sociometric data is inferred from the population's own perception of social
connectivity, opinion polls where sociometric data is obtained independent of the
populations beliefs and data aggregation using market mechanisms. On comparing
the entropy of the error of between the prediction of each of these different methods
with the truth, preliminary results suggest that sociometric data does indeed improve
the enterprise of information aggregation. The results also raise interesting questions
about the relevance and application of different kinds of sociometric data as well as
the somewhat surprising efficiency of information market mechanisms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
While many of the phenomena we observe is predictable, the accuracy and reliability
of the prediction relies a great deal on the amount of information we have regarding
that particular occurrence. However, it is seldom the case that the information re-
garding the phenomenon of interest is attainable from one source (we usually have
to refer to multiple texts on a specific subject, talk to many different experts, etc in
order to have confidence in the conclusions we draw on a subject).
When the information is dispersed across many people, there are several ways
to go about collecting that information accurately. The best established of these is
random sampling, where a representative subset of the universe is interviewed and the
responses aggregated by straightforward counting to determine the population's belief
on a particular occurrence. However, such sampling and counting fails to account for
the fact that many times people give responses that do not reflect the amount of
information available to them regarding the occurrence, either because they have
some incentive to give misleading answers, or they have no incentive to put some
effort towards accurately analyzing the data at their disposal.
This question of incentives has led to the emergence of information markets as a
way of aggregating dispersed knowledge. The main idea behind information markets
is to have people buy and sell stocks/securities reflecting their perceived beliefs in a
particular outcome. Since the possibility of making and losing money is very real in
such markets, all players have an incentive to use their information truthfully (albeit
selfishly), with the end result that the final state of the market (prices and trade
volumes) tend to reflect the underlying phenomenon.
However, consider a situation where we desire to predict an answer to the question
"Will South Africa emerge victorious in the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa?".
Furthermore, suppose we have three people A, B and C, who are part of our sample
population. By traditional sampling and counting, we might get the responses "yes",
"yes" and "no" from A, B and C respectively, thereby concluding that it is 66%
likely for South African to win. However, suppose persons A and B are the very best
of friends - they spend lots of time together, work together, watch football games
together at the bar every week, etc - and person C practically has no contact with
A or B. Then it is plausible that A's response might just reflect B's beliefs or vice
versa, which would suggest that we may want to weight A and B's total response
slightly less, so that the final likelihoods might be, for instance, a 50% chance for
South Africa to win and a 50% chance to lose. This example serves to illustrate that
social information may play a greater role than revealed by the sample-and-count
or the information market mechanisms of aggregating information. For this reason,
it is worth explicating the role played by the social network in the accuracy of the
final result, and comparing it to the results of the other methods. Towards this end,
we set up experiments based on [3] and extended to include sociometric information
collected from the users using wearable devices.
1.1 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is in attempting to explicate how to factor social
information into the enterprise of information aggregation, along with suggestions of
how that might be improved as social network analysis tools and models gain more
sophistication.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The content of this thesis is grouped into six chapters. In broad terms, we provide
background on related work in the areas of information aggregation and social network
analysis, after which we describe the aggregation algorithms we employed, the tools
we developed and used for the experiments, the experimental setup and finally an
analysis of the result.
Chapter 1 Introduction: We motivate the objective of the thesis, state it's
contributions and outline the progression of the rest of the thesis.
Chapter 2 Background: We give an overview of the related fields of information
aggregation and social network analysis as is pertinent to this thesis.
Chapter 3 Methodology: We give an account of the algorithms and perfor-
mance metrics we use in our analysis.
Chapter 4 Experimental Setup: We describe the setup of the experiment,
along with an overview of all the software and hardware tools we developed and used.
Chapter 5 Results: This chapter discusses the results of our experiments, and
how those relate with the expected results. We also discuss any possible biases we may
have inadvertently introduced that might explain discrepancies between the expected
and the actual results, and how those biases can be corrected in future.
Chapter 6 Applications: We discuss several situations where we expect the
methodology we employed to be either superior or inferior to other methods and why
we expect the respective result.
Chapter 7 Conclusion: The thesis is concluded with a restatement of the con-
tributions of the thesis, the ramifications of the results of the thesis and the direction
that future research in this area might progress.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Regular Sample-And-Count
This is the most widely used method of aggregating dispersed information because
it is well understood and, once a representative sample of the population has been
identified, is easy to implement. The only significant difficulty in using this method
(aside from the cost of resources that may be required if the sample size is very
large) is the determination of a sampling frame that is representative of the entire
population under investigation. The question of how representative a frame is varies
depending on the purposes of the study, and once such a frame has been established
and a sampling size determined then one of many sampling methods can be employed:
simple random sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling etc [8].
Note that we use the term "regular" in "regular sample-and-count" to distinguish
this method from the method we employ in this thesis, which also uses a representative
population (hence a sample of the population). The main difference is that in the
regular sample-and-count, each data point usually contributes equally in the analysis;
for instance, when trying to predict an election, the results are aggregated such that
each response from the opinion poll is weighted equally (once). The method we
use, in contrast, tries to factor in sociometric information by weighting the responses
according to sociometric data collected from the population.
Regular sample-and-count suffers a number of shortcomings. First, the quality of
the responses might not be as good as the investigator hopes; many people will give
inaccurate responses due to a number of reasons:
1. They have no information whatsoever regarding some particular event, but
nevertheless feel inclined to give some sort of answer (either because they do not
want to appear ignorant, or feel obligated in some way).
2. They have all the information they need to answer some question accurately,
but the information requires some thought and analysis which they have no incentive
to perform.
3. They only have partial information, and have no incentive to try and make an
educated guess based on that partial information.
This first problem boils down to a question of incentives, and as we will see below,
information markets are designed specifically to counter this problem.
Second, a simple sample-and-count usually leaves out of the analysis sociometric
information that might be of relevance to the enterprise. As pointed out earlier, two
identical responses from individuals who interact frequently are should probably be
weighted differently compared to the same responses from individuals who almost
never interact because the second set of responses is more independent that the first.
This might not matter in some instances, where the people's beliefs (regardless of
how they are achieved) represent the ground truth (for instance, an opinion poll for
an election); in other instances, the phenomena we're trying to deduce or predict (e.g
determining the weight of a cow by asking many random people to give their best
guess [16]) may not be affected by the beliefs of the sample population and therefore
correcting for the effects of their social network may improve results significantly.
One way of incorporating sociometric data might be to use it when selecting the
sample population. This may work in some cases, but in others it may not be easy to
obtain a sample population that meets all social networking criteria relevant to the
study; furthermore, there may be unavoidable social contact during the duration of
the study. Therefore, it may be prudent to measure sociometric information before
and through the duration of the study and bring it to bear during the analysis stage
of the study.
2.2 Information Markets
In the recent past, the idea of setting up information markets (also know as prediction
markets) as a means of aggregating dispersed information for predictive or analytic
purposes has become popular, and preliminary results show that such information
markets can do very well [13, 17]. In brief, the idea of information markets is to
create securities whose cash value is anchored to the event(s) being predicted. Like
any other securities market, people who buy when prices are low and sell when prices
are high make money while those who buy when prices are high and sell when prices
are low lose money. As the market proceeds, the prices of the securities is believed
to approach the true distribution of beliefs.
As mentioned earlier, one of the main benefits of information markets is that they
provide an incentive for the participants to report their beliefs accurately, (which in
this case means buying stocks that they believe will perform well and selling those
that they believe will not), since their payoff is directly linked to the prices of the
stocks they trade. This helps counter one of the problems of the sample-and-count
method where the participants have no incentive to accurately report their beliefs.
In addition, the infrastructure supporting the world wide web provides an excel-
lent platform to run these information markets with numerous participants, making
it much more economically feasible to execute such markets than it previously was. In
fact, there are a number of such prediction markets operating online today (with both
real money and play money), for instance the Hollywood Stock Exchange for predict-
ing which movies will do well in theatres (http://www.hsx.com), The Iowa Electronic
Markets for predicting economic and political events (http://www.biz.uiowa.edi/iem/),
Tradesports for predicting sporting events (http://www.tradesports.com), etc.
However, information markets suffer their own shortcomings:
1. Liquidity: Liquidity is the degree to which an asset or security can be bought
or sold in the market without affecting the assets price, and is characterized by high
volumes of trade. If the market is not sufficiently liquid, then any one trade may
adversely affect the market, which means that the prices will fluctuate wildly and
therefore not approach the true distribution of beliefs. This was of particular concern
to us in this thesis, since the market we instituted was quite thin; nevertheless, the
results of the market were surprisingly close to the true distribution.
2. Manipulation: A rogue trader could try and manipulate the market to
his/her advantage, with total disregard of what they truly believe. This possibility of
manipulation is linked to the issue of liquidity - the more traders (and trade volumes)
there are, the more liquid the market is, and therefore the more difficult it is for
a single person (or small group of people) to manipulate the market. Consider the
following entry in Wikipedia:
"...In the Tradesports 2004 presidential markets there was an apparent manipula-
tion effort (an anonymous trader sold short so many Bush 2004 presidential futures
contracts that the price was driven to zero, implying a zero percent chance that Bush
would win. The only rational purpose of such a trade would be an attempt to manip-
ulate the market in a strategy called a "bear raid". The manipulation effort failed,
however, as the price of the contract rebounded rapidly to its previous level.)..."
3. Theoretical Challenges: There have also been questions about the ability
of such information markets to really perform well. First, Dr. Charles F. Manski
[10] attempts to show that under a wide range of assumptions, predictions of these
markets do not closely correspond to the actual probability beliefs of the market
participants unless the probability is near either 0 or 1. However, Steven Gjerstad
[7] has shown that prediction market prices are very close to the mean beliefs of the
market participants if the distribution of beliefs is smooth. Justin Wolfers and Eric
Zitzewits [17] have obtained similar results.
Second, there has been widespread belief that markets operated using "play money"
cannot generate credible predictions, possibly because play money supposedly does
not provide "real" incentive. However, currently accumulated data suggests other-
wise; Pennock et al [13] analyzed data from the Hollywood Stock Exchange and the
Foresight Exchange (both play money markets) and concluded that the market prices
predicted outcomes and/or outcome frequencies in the real world.
Third, markets tend to inadvertently measure things not intended to be factored
into the final determination made by the market, such as the risk tendencies of the
participants. Risk neutral participants tend to undervalue the securities while risk
loving individuals tend to over-value them, and these biases show up in the final
market prices.
4. Social Information: Finally, these markets do not explicitly deal with social
network information. There is no doubt, however, that social connections do play
a role in influencing the beliefs of the players. We believe that in the course of the
market, there is some social interaction between the participants which the market
converts to a price that can be easily interpreted by other players (for instance, if
from previous history player 1 seems to make lots of money, then if player 1 offers to
buy lots of stock A and some other player(s) get to know of this, they may themselves
be tempted to buy more of stock A). One of the goals of this thesis is to use a method
that explicates the social connections between participants and maybe shed some
light on what goes on behind the scenes in these prediction markets with regard of
interpretation of social signals.
2.3 Alternative Methods
Other aggregation schemes have been suggested that try to leverage the wisdom of
the crowds without the pitfalls of information markets. For instance, [10] suggests
that directly asking a group of participants to estimate probabilities may lead to
better results. As for incentives, the participants can be compensated based on how
close they are to the truth, which provides some incentive to be right. In fact, these
"suggestions" form the basis of the experimental method developed by Chen et. al.
[3] that this thesis borrows from.
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Chapter 3
New Approaches
3.1 Chen, Fine and Huberman Approach 1
Kay-Yut Chen, Leslie R. Fine and Bernardo A. Huberman of HP Laboratories de-
veloped a novel approach of aggregating information that uses a small number of
individuals participating in an imperfect information market [3]. What follows is an
extended quote from pages 47 - 50 of the Chen et. al. paper describing the methods
and analysis done in [3] (with different section, equation and citation numbering),
since these methods and analysis are essential to this thesis.
3.1.1 Introduction
Information markets generally involve the trading of state-contingent se-
curities. If these markets are large enough and properly designed, they
can be more accurate than other techniques for extracting diffuse infor-
mation, such as surveys and opinions polls. There are problems however,
with information markets, as they tend to suffer from information traps
[2, 11], illiquidity [15], manipulation [5, 12] and lack of equilibrium [1, 14]
These problems are exacerbated when the groups involved are small and
not very experienced at playing in these markets. Even when possible,
Ithis section is quoted verbatim from pages 47-50 of the paper by Chen, Fine and Huberman [3]
since the methods and analysis described therein are essential to this thesis
proper market design is very expensive, fragile, and context specific.
In spite of these obstacles, it is worth noting that certain participants
in information markets can have either superior knowledge of the infor-
mation being sought, or are better processors of the knowledge harnessed
by the information market itself. By keeping track of the profits and final
holdings of the members, one can determine which participants have these
talents, along with their risk attitudes.
In this paper, [the original paper by Chen, Fine and Huberman] we
propose a method of harnessing the distributed knowledge of a group of
individuals by using a two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, an infor-
mation market is run among members of the group in order to extract
risk attitudes from the participants, as well as their ability at predicting a
given outcome. This information is used to construct a nonlinear aggrega-
tion function that allows for collective predictions of uncertain events. In
the second stage, individuals are simply asked to provide forecasts about
an uncertain event, and they are rewarded according the accuracy of their
forecasts. These individual forecasts are aggregated using the nonlinear
function and used to predict the outcome. As we show empirically, this
nonlinear aggregation mechanism vastly outperforms both the imperfect
market and the best of the participants.
However, these results are achieved in a very particular environment,
that of no public information. Public information is bound to intro-
duce strong correlations in the knowledge possessed by members of the
group, correlations that are not explicitly taken into account by the above-
described aggregation algorithm. So, we propose a set of suitable modifi-
cations that would allow the detection of the amount of public informa-
tion present in a group so as to subtract it. Assuming that subjects can
differentiate between the public and private information they hold, that
the private aspect of their information is truly private (held only by one
individual), and that the public information is truly public (held by at
least two individuals), we create a coordination variant of the mechanism
which allows for the identification of public information within a group
and its subtraction when aggregating individual predictions about uncer-
tain outcomes. Experiments in the laboratory show that this aggregation
mechanism outperforms the market, the best player in the group, and the
initially proposed aggregation mechanism.
3.1.2 Aggregation Mechanism Design
We consider first an environment in which a set of N people have purely
private information about a future event. If all players had the same
amount of information about the event and were perfectly risk-neutral,
then it would be easy to compute the true posterior probabilities using
Bayes's rule. If individuals receive independent information conditioned
on the true outcome, their prior beliefs are uniform (no other information
is available other than the event sequence), and they each report the true
posterior probabilities given their information, then the probability of an
outcome s, conditioned on all of their observed information I , is given by:
p(sJl) = PS1PS2" PN (3.1)
Vs PS1P2.. SN
where p,, is the probability that individual i(i = 1, ..., N) assigns to
outcome s. This result allows us simply to take the individual predictions,
multiply them together, and normalize them in order to get an aggregate
probability distribution. However, this will only work under the extremely
restrictive constraints enumerated above. The first of these issues we
will consider is how to design a mechanism that elicits truthful reporting
from individuals. ... [T]he following mechanism will induce risk neutral
utility maximizing individuals to report their prior probabilities truthfully.
We ask each player to report a vector of perceived state-probabilities,
ql,q 2, ...qN with the constraint that the vector sums to one. Then the
true state x is revealed and each player paid cl + c2 x log(qx), where ci
and c2 are positive numbers.
While this very simple method might seem to aggregate dispersed in-
formation well, it suffers from the fact that, due to their risk attitude,
most individuals do not necessarily report their true posterior probabili-
ties conditioned on their information. In most realistic situations, a risk
averse person will report a probability distribution that is flatter than
her true beliefs as she tends to spread her bets among all possible out-
comes. In the extreme case of risk aversion, an individual will report
a uniform probability distribution regardless of her information. In this
case, no predictive information is revealed by her report. Conversely, a
risk-loving individual will tend to report a probability distribution that is
more sharply peaked around a particular prediction, and in the extreme
case of risk loving behavior a subject's optimal response will be to put
all his weight on the most probable state according to his observations.
In this case, his report will contain some, but not all the information
contained in his observations.
In order to account for both the diverse levels of risk aversion and
information strengths, we add a stage to the mechanism. Before individ-
uals are asked to report their beliefs, they participate in an information
market designed to elicit their risk attitudes and other relevant behavioral
information. This information market is driven by the same information
structure in the reporting game. We use information markets to capture
the behavioral information that is needed to derive the correct aggrega-
tion function. Note that, although the participant pool is too small for
the market to act perfectly efficiently, it is a powerful enough mechanism
to help us illicit the needed information.
The nonlinear aggregation function that we constructed is of the form:
P(s I) = 1 P2 SN (3.2)
-', P81 P2 s26 ..
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where /3i is the exponent assigned to individual i. The role of /3i is to
help recover the true posterior probabilities from individual is report. The
value of /3 for a risk neutral individual is one, as he should report the true
probabilities coming out of his information. For a risk averse individual,
13i is greater than one so as to compensate for the flat distribution that he
reports. The reverse, namely Oi smaller than one, applies to risk loving
individuals. In terms of both the market performance and the individual
holdings and risk behavior, a simple functional form for fi is given by
= r( )c (3.3)
9 i
where r is a parameter that captures the risk attitude of the whole
market and is reflected in the market prices of the assets, Vi is the utility
of individual i , and ai is the variance of his holdings over time. We use
c as a normalization factor so that if r = 1, E i equals the number of
individuals. Thus the problem lies in the actual determination of both
the risk attitudes of the market as a whole and of the individual players.
To do so, notice that if the market is perfectly efficient then the sum
of the prices of the securities should be exactly equal to the payoff of the
winning security. However, in the thin markets characterized here, this
efficiency condition was rarely met. Moreover, although prices that do not
sum to the winning payoff indicate an arbitrage opportunity, it was rarely
possible to realize this opportunity with a portfolio purchase (once again,
due to the thinness of the market). However, we can use these facts to
our advantage. If the sum of the prices is below the winning payoff, then
we can infer that the market is risk-averse, while if the price is above this
payoff then the market exhibits risk-loving behavior. Thus, the ratio of
the winning payoff to the sum of the prices provides a proxy for the risk
attitude of the market as a whole.
The ratio of value to risk, (V//l ), captures individual risk attitudes
and predictive power. An individual's value Vi is given by the market
prices multiplied by his holdings, summed over all the securities. As in
portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1959), his amount of risk can be measured by
the variance of his values using normalized market prices as probabilities
of the possible outcomes.
3.1.3 Experimental Design for Private Information
Experiments
In order to test this mechanism we conducted a number of experiments
at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, in Palo Alto, California. The subjects
were undergraduate and graduate students at Stanford University and
knew the experimental parameters discussed below, as they were part of
the instructions and training for the sessions. The five sessions were run
with eight to thirteen subjects in each.
We implemented the two-stage mechanism in a laboratory setting.
Possible outcomes were referred to as "states" in the experiments. There
were 10 possible states, A through J, in all the experiments. Each had an
Arrow-Debreu state security associated with it. The information available
to the subjects consisted of observed sets of random draws from an urn
with replacement. After privately drawing the state for the ensuing period,
we filled the urn with one ball for each state, plus an additional two balls
for the just-drawn true state security. Thus it is slightly more likely to
observe a ball for the true state than others.
We allowed subjects to observe different number of draws from the
urn in order to control the amount of information given to the subjects.
Three types of information structures were used to ensure that the results
obtained were robust. In the first treatment, each subject received three
draws from the urn, with replacement. In the second treatment, half of the
subjects received five draws with replacement, and the other half received
one. In a third treatment, half of the subjects received a random number
of draws (averaging three, and also set such that the total number of draws
in the community was 3N) and the other half received three, again with
replacement.
The information market we constructed consists of an artificial call
market in which the securities are traded. The states were equally likely
and randomly drawn. If a state occurred, the associated state security
paid off at a value of 1,000 francs. Hence, the expected value of any
given security, a priori, was 100 francs. Subjects were provided with some
securities and francs at the beginning of each period.
Each period consists of six rounds, lasting 90 seconds each. At the end
of each round, our system gathers the bids and asks and determines market
price and volume. The transactions are then completed and another call
round began. At the end of six trading rounds the period is over, the true
state security is revealed, and subjects are paid according to the holdings
of that security. This procedure is then repeated in the next period, with
no correlation between the states drawn in each period.
In the second-stage, every subject played under the same information
structure as in the first stage, although the draws and the true states
were independent from those in the first. Each period they received their
draws from the urn and 100 tickets. They were asked to distribute these
tickets across the 10 states with the constraint that all 100 tickets must
be spent each period and that at least one ticket is spent on each state.
Since the fraction of tickets spent determines Psi, this implies that p ,i is
never zero. The subjects were given a chart that told them how many
francs they would earn upon the realization of the true state as a function
of the number of tickets spent on the true state security. The payoff is a
linear function of the log of the percentage of tickets placed in the winning
state.
3.2 Augmenting the Chen, Fine and Huberman
approach with Social Information
From the discussion above, we see that the Chen, Fine and Huberman two-stage
approach aims to tackle two main weaknesses previously discussed: correcting for the
risk tendencies that are usually embedded in information markets, and accounting
for social connectivity. The method discounts the effects of social connectivity by
requesting users to provide vectors (qi) denoting their belief of what information is
in the public domain, as opposed to privately held information (pi). Asking the
participants to provide these q vectors assumes that the participants are in general
adept at distinguishing what is public from what is private, and interpreting how
the information in the public domain might affect other participants' bets in the
experiment (in their experiment design, Chen, Fine and Huberman ask participants
to match their qis with another participants' qjs in such a way that will profit them
most).
In many cases, however, it is reasonable to expect that if we ask the participants
to provide such vectors qi, the vectors may not be representative of the amount of
public information in the market, especially when it is not clear to the participants
what is public and what is truly private (the Chen, Fine and Huberman experiments
used public and private draws from an urn so that there was no doubt what was truly
private and what was public). We believe that we might be able to do a good job of
estimating the amount of public information indirectly by analyzing data showing the
social connectivity of the participants - who talks to whom, how often they talk, how
often one person's opinions influence the other in general and in particular subjects,
etc.
This sociometric data may be available from a number of sources such as previous
studies and interviews with the participants. However, with the increasing prevalence
of portable and wearable computer devices, we are also be able to get representative
sociometric data by using these devices to directly measure both the quality and
quantity of contact between individuals and using that as a proxy for social connec-
tivity [4], which in turn should aid in the enterprise of determining how much of the
information is public and how much is private.
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Chapter 4
Experimental Setup
We set up our experiment with a number of goals in mind. First, we sought to
determine the applicability of the analysis of the Chen et. al. approach to real world
situations. To this end, we ran two parallel experiments; the first was a replica of the
Chen et. al. experiment where subjects were asked to draw from urns - both publicly
and privately - and subsequently asked to give probability vectors that were then
analyzed (see chapter 5) to determine the suitability of the approach as an information
aggregation mechanism. Our "real world"equivalent of the Chen et. al. experiment
was a three-stage experiment designed to have a similar information structure to the
Chen et. al. experiment, except with less control over the information revealed to
the participants as we would expect in real-world situations. The three stages of the
experiment were a "treasure hunt stage", a "betting stage" and a "trading stage".
4.1 Treasure Hunt
The participants (six per run) were allowed 20 minutes to roam a specified area of the
MIT Media Lab, with instruction to look for as many clues as possible. Each such
clue contained a photo of someone holding an electronic gadgets of some sort (PDAs,
bluetooth headsets, led-infested gizmos, etc). An example of such a clue is shown in
Figure 4-1
Information (similar to the urn drawings of the Chen et. al. setup) was dissem-
Figure 4-1: A sample clue
inated to the subjects by way of these clues. The participants were instructed to
pay attention to the contents of each such clue (without altering/moving it), with
the understanding that the each clue contained information that would be useful in
the betting and trading stages of the experiment to follow; however, they were not
told exactly what to look for in the clues. In this way, we attempted to approximate
real-world situations where people may be asked to provide information from their
recollection, except they did not initially have specific instructions what information
to gather. (See the section on applications, §6 for an extended example of such a
scenario).
The six participants in each run were divided into two groups/teams of three
each. The purpose of this division was to create distinguishable groups with more
intra-group contact than inter-group contact, for the purposes of measuring how such
contact influenced the eventual results. To ensure the distinction we desired, we
added another artificial information boundary - group members were allowed to tell
each other where some of the clues were hidden without revealing the contents of the
clues themselves; however, group members from different groups were not allowed
to communicate. In addition, each subject was informed that they would be ranked
according to the combined performance (entropy) of both the group and the individual
in the betting and the market stage; this ensured that there was some incentive to
share information between group members while discouraging team members from
sharing everything, since we desired that the participants should eventually have
~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;~;;;;
Team One Team Two
clue number user1 user2 user3 user4 user5 user6
1
2
-J
Table 4.1: A sample of the information sheets provided for recording observations
different information, some of which would be private and some public.
To aid the subjects in recollection, we provided them with blank sheets of paper
on which to record whatever they thought was necessary. Furthermore, since we as
the experimenters needed to know exactly what clues each subject saw, we gave them
a table to fill, an excerpt of which is shown in Table 4.1.
Under the column corresponding to him/her, each subject checked all the clues
that they saw, leaving everything else empty. We filled in the rest of the table as
described in §4.2
4.1.1 Measuring Social Contact
As mentioned previously in §3.2, we also desired to estimate public information in-
dependently of the responses of the subject. To do this, we needed to observe and
measure 'social contact' between the subjects, and from these measurements try and
construct a picture of what information was public, and test if we get similar or bet-
ter results than relying only on the subjects' reports. To accomplish this goal, each
subject was fitted with an UbER Badge [9].
The UbER Badge (Figure 4-2) is a wearable electronic device that is capable of
both radio frequency and infra red communication as well as displaying simple graph-
ics and scrolling text on an LED display. The UbER Badge can also be augmented
with fixed infrared beacons (Figure 4-3) that constantly broadcast an IR signal, so
that whenever a person stands close to one such beacon, an event is registered on
the badge and transmitted over radio frequency to a base station that logs all such
events.
Using the UbER Badge, we were able to detect every time two subjects were facing
each other (presumably in communication of some sort) via the IR bookmarking
1_I I I I I I
Figure 4-3: The IR BeaconFigure 4-2: One subject
weaming the UbER Badge
capabilities of the badges. In addition, an IR beacon was fixed next to each clue, so
that we could also reliably tell which clues the subject saw independently of what the
subjects write on the information sheet in Figure 4.1.
4.2 Betting Stage
Once the subjects were done with the treasure hunt stage (§4.1), we collected the
information sheets and filled in the remaining columns; under each subjects' name,
we checked against clue numbers to indicate that a particular subject saw the corre-
sponding clue, so that eventually, all the information sheets for one run of the treasure
hunt had identical information. Using that information, we expected that the sub-
jects should be able to distinguish truly private information from public (where pub-
lic is defined as information shared between two or more individuals) in a relatively
straightforward manner: a clue is truly private if it was seen by only one individual,
otherwise it is public.
At this point, we then informed the subjects that the people in the clues each
appeared a specified number of times that formed a specific distribution, with one of
the people appearing more times than anyone else and therefore being the 'true' state.
The subjects had been introduced to all these people before, so we did not expect
.. ............
any problems in differentiating one from the other, but to avoid any such ambiguity
each of the five people appearing in the clues was assigned one of five colors - blue,
green, white, red and yellow - and the subjects were each given photos of the people
to aid in recollection.
The subjects were then asked to supply the same information as in the Chen et.
al. experiment: vectors p of the posterior probabilities of the frequency of appearance
of the people in the clues given their information, and vectors q of bets placed by
someone else in the room regarding the perceived state probabilities. To create an
incentive to ensure truthful reporting, the payoff was as in [3] - a linear function of
the log percentage of bets placed in the true/winning state (for the first set of bets
p) added to a scaled log function of the players q bets matched with another player
in the game:
P = c1 + C2 X log(pix) + f (, j) x (c3 + c4 x log(qxj)) (4.1)
where cl, c2 , C3 and c4 are positive constants, j is chosen such that f(-, -) >
f(-, -) for all k, and the function f(.) is given by:
f(V,-) = (1- [. E|S - YS|] 2 V (4.2)
4.3 Trading Stage
Finally, the subjects participated in a market similar to that in [3] to determine the
market prediction of the distribution of the different people (henceforth states) in the
urn, whereby in our case, the virtual urn was supplied by the treasure hunt stage.
Instead of running a physical call market (where the subjects write their bids/asks
which are physically collected by a trader, who determines the market price and
completes the transactions), we implemented an online call market with exactly those
same capabilities, i.e. an online call market which allowed subjects to sell and buy
securities based on their perceived distribution of the true distribution of securities.
Figure 4-4 shows a screenshot of the online market.
[ 0:00 ]1
Figure 4-4: A Screenshot of the Online Securities Trading Application
.. 
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Chapter 5
Analysis and Results
5.1 Analysis
We compared the performance of the different aggregation schemes against the true
distribution of the securities in the urn using a Kullback-Leibler entropy measure as
in [3], which gives the energy in the error between two distributions. Specifically, if
p is the true distribution and q is the prediction using any one of the aggregation
methods, then the entropy between the two distributions is given by:
KL(p, q) = Yps log (P) (5.1)
KL(p, q) is zero only if p and q are identical, otherwise KL(p, q) > 0. In our
analysis, we compared the following results against the truth:
1. The prediction made by the market.
2. The prediction due only to the private bets placed by the subjects, the probability
of each outcome s conditioned on all observations I is estimated by:
P(s~I) = PS1P82 .PS""N (5.2)
Ev, PSlPS2 .. PSN
3. The prediction due only to the private bets, modified by the risk information
(gathered from the market stage as explained in §3.1.2) and aggregated by:
P(s ) = (5.3)
where Oi is the risk-dependent exponent assigned to individual i. The role of
/3i is to help recover the true posterior probabilities from individual i, report.
The value of / for a risk neutral individual is one, as he should report the true
probabilities coming out of his information. For a risk averse individual, 3i is
greater than one so as to compensate for the flat distribution that he reports.
The reverse, namely 3i smaller than one, applies to risk loving individuals.
In terms of both the market performance and the individual holdings and risk
behavior, a simple functional form for /i is given by
S= r(i )c (5.4)
o-i
where r is a parameter that captures the risk attitude of the whole market and
is reflected in the market prices of the assets, Vi is the utility of individual i ,
ai is the variance of his holdings over time and c is a normalization factor so
that if r = 1, E /i equals the number of individuals.
4. The prediction due to the private bets and the public bets, where each person's
public vector was modified by their private vector and the result augmented by
risk information in calculating the state probabilities as follows:
(ps l )01 p 2 PsN )ON
s1 I (P 
Ys2 ... 
sN
P(sl) q s2 =sN (5.5)
E. ( P 2  2 ... (PN2 N
Sqsl / q2 . qS
5. The prediction due to the private bets and the public bets, where the public bets
were aggregated together into a single public q, vector according to:
N
q = Os (5.6)
Ei=1 A
And the resulting q, used to estimate the outcome probabilities conditioned on
observations as follows:
P(s|I) = " q3 j \ / (5.7)
,Vs ( qs I ' \ q, q
5.2 Results
The graphs that follow use the following key for x-axis labels:
1. P - Prediction with the private bet vector (p) only
2. P/R - Prediction with the private vector augmented by risk information
3. P/R/M - Private vector prediction information corrected using each persons
public vector of bets, and augmented with risk information
4. P/R/G - Private vector prediction information corrected using a weighted sum
of the public vector and augmented with risk information
5. M - The market prediction
The entropy of the truth is zero by definition and therefore sits on the x-axis.
5.2.1 The experimental setup by Chen et. al. and our trea-
sure hunt setup are good approximations of each other
As can be seen in Figure 5-1 (the corresponding data is in Table A.1 and Table A.2
in Appendix A) the mean of the entropy of all the trials of our implementation of the
Chen et. al. setup and the treasure hunt setup show similar trends as different social
information is added to the aggregation function. This suggests that the Chen et. al.
setup is in fact a good approximation for some real world scenarios.
In our treasure hunt experiment, we took some extra precaution (splitting each
run of the experiment into two teams, and restricting communication between the
Comparison of EntroW Mean (Standard DevIton) In Cheenet al. Setup and Veasure unt Setup
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Figure 5-1: Comparison of the mean (standard deviation) of entropy between the Chen et.
al. setup and our treasure hunt setup
teams - see §4.1) to ensure that the general information structure resembled that
in the original Chen et. al. experiment. Nevertheless, we had less control over
the information that was revealed to the subjects or how it was shared between the
subjects. We expect that there are many real-world situations with similar conditions
- people have imperfect information regarding an event, with different amounts of
private and public information available to each person. This result suggests that
in such situations, the analysis developed by Chen et. al. can be employed with
reasonable results.
5.2.2 Adding more social information improves the result of
aggregation
An additional result evident from Figure 5-1 is that the adding more information of
a social nature (the risk preferences of the subjects, the information that is public
between the subjects) improves the accuracy of the aggregation mechanism. Using
only the private bets of the perceived probability distribution, the treasure hunt pre-
diction has an entropy of 1.838 (with a standard deviation of 1.396); this improves
to a mean of 0.388 (0.192 standard deviation) when we correct each subject's private
... . . .. ........... .. ........ ...... .
bets with their individual bets and augment that with information on their risk ten-
dencies. This leads us to hypothesize that the market is also somehow incorporating
social information in it's aggregation, something we discuss further in §5.2.3
To further test the hypothesis that including more social information results in
more accurate predictions, we decided to take advantage of the team structures we
enforced. In theory, the treasure hunt subjects should be able to tell more accu-
rately what information was public within their team, because they worked together
throughout the hunt, albeit with individualistic goals. Therefore we expect that per-
forming the analysis along team divisions should improve the results:
Comparison of the Reasure Hunt Results With and without Team Structure Information
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Team Breakdown
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Different Aggregation Mechanisms
Figure 5-2: Comparison of the mean (standard deviation) of entropy with and without
accounting for the team structure of the treasure hunt data
As seen in Figure 5-2 that in fact turns out to be true; in all cases, the mean
entropy when we perform the analysis along teams is lower than when we do not take
the team structure into account (the corresponding team data is in Table A.3).
As explained earlier in §4.1.1, one of our objectives was to determine if the social
information can be measured independently of the reported probabilities and then
factored into the analysis. Even though we knew the team breakdown because we
enforced it in the beginning, it turns out that from the data collected using the UbER
Badge and the infra-red beacons, we could actually deduce the team structure:
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Figure 5-3 shows a plot of the multi-dimensional scaled distance between the
subjects for one instance of the treasure hunt experiment based on the data of infra
red logging of encounters between the players. From this data, we can infer which
teams particular players belonged to without prior knowledge of the team structure
[6]; the inferred teams could then be used in the analysis to yield results identical to
Figure 5-2.
This result is useful because it suggests that if we can collect reasonable sociomet-
ric data about the population - say using various wearable systems (such as mobile
phones), mining e-mail communications, etc - the data may be used to augment the
Chen et. al. information aggregation mechanism to yield more accurate results.
5.2.3 The market intrinsically performs some aggregation of
the social information
Finally, we analyzed the evolution of the entropy of the market aggregation over
successive call rounds (as explained in §4.3, the market is organized as a call market,
where users place bids and asks in each round; the bids and asks are collected, a
pseudo-demand curve is constructed and a market price for each security is determined
at which sales and purchases occur). The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 5-4.
This shows that over successive rounds, the market prices generally approach
the true distribution of probabilities; over the course of the rounds, the market is
aggregating information from the subjects into a more and more accurate result. We
believe that part of this is the aggregation of the social information that is explicitly
accounted for in the other aggregation mechanisms (through the public information)
but is not explicated in the market operation. We hypothesize that over time, as the
subjects buy and sell securities representing the different states, they are constantly
expressing their beliefs as well as adjusting them by observing and reacting to the
stock prices, so that by communicating the prices to the subjects and affecting their
behavior, the market is implicitly incorporating the social information present in the
other methods.
Figure 5-4: Evolution of the entropy (as determined by market prices) over successive rounds
of the call market
To test this hypothesis further, we calculated the correlation coefficient of the
error between the prediction made by the different mechanisms and the truth. Our
hypothesis was that if indeed the market is aggregating information by incorporating
social informaiton as suggested above, then the errors made by the market should be
more similar to the mechanisms that include more social information. In other words,
the correlation coefficient should increase when we compare the market aggregation
to the P, P/R, P/R/M and P/R/G (as defined at the beginning of Section §5.2) in
that order. Therefore, we calculated:
Pp, cov(ep,m) (5.8)
'ep O'em
where em refers to the difference (error) between the market and the truth, calcu-
lated as m - t, and ep is the error between the predicted distribution and the truth
(p-t) for each of the other aggregation functions. The results are shown in Figure 5-5
and Table 5.1.
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Figure 5-5: The correlation coefficient (p-value) of the different aggregation mechanisms for
the all treasure hunt sessions
probx probr probm probg probt
prob, 1.0000 0.9643 0.1314 0.2074 0.2864
(1.0000) (0.0000) (0.6407) (0.4583) (0.3008)
probr 0.9643 1.0000 0.3431 0.4181 0.4192
(0.0000) (1.0000) (0.2106) (0.1209) (0.1198)
probm 0.1314 0.3431 1.0000 0.9935 0.6847
(0.6407) (0.2106) (1.0000) (0.0000) (0.0049)
probg 0.2074 0.4181 0.9935 1.0000 0.7129
(0.4583) (0.1209) (0.0000) (1.0000) (0.0029)
probu 0.2864 0.4192 0.6847 0.7129 1.0000
(0.3008) (0.1198) (0.0049) (0.0029) (1.0000)
Table 5.1: Correlation coefficient (p-value) matrix of the error between the different aggre-
gation mechanisms for treasure hunt
Key:
1. probx : The prediction using private bets only
2. prob, : The prediction using private bets plus risk information
3. probm : The prediction using private bets plus risk information plus my public
bets
4. probg : The prediction using private bets plus risk information plus group public
bets
5. probt : The market prediction
. .
.... ...........
As can be seen from Figure 5-5 and Table 5.1 the correlation coefficient of the
error between the market and the other aggregation methods does indeed increase
in the order expected, which further supports the hypothesis that the market does
indeed aggregate the information by including social information as explained at the
beginning of this section.
Chapter 6
Applications
Having analyzed the performance of the aggregation mechanism proposed by Chen
et. al. applied to a "real world" situation and augmented with sociometric data,
it is important to point out instances where such an approach might be ideal for
aggregating information.
The results show that the aggregation mechanism performs quite well in situa-
tions of imperfect private and public information. To illustrate an example where
this approach might be ideal, consider soldiers heading out to the battlefield for re-
connaissance purposes as they try to acclimatize to new surroundings. The soldiers
will typically move out in different units, with each unit surveying a different part of
the area of interest. There is relatively frequent contact and communication between
members of the same unit, while the contact between soldiers in different units is gen-
erally infrequent during the duration of the reconnaissance. In addition, we expect
that although the different units are surveying different areas, there is a significant
possibility of overlap in the areas surveyed by different units, i.e. one unit might cover
some ground previously covered by another unit, or two units might even end up at
the same place at the same time (although this second scenario is easier to avoid by
co-ordination of the different teams).
This reconnaissance scenario closely mirrors the treasure hunt experimental setup
- different teams set out to gather information and, depending on where they go and
who they interact with, the information is dispersed among the people, with some
of it being public while and the rest private. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that aggregating the reports of the soldiers using the methods discussed should give
a good approximation of the true distribution of states, where those states could be
anything such as the number of enemy tanks spotted, the likelihood of an area being
a major enemy hide-out, etc. In fact, remembering that the subjects in the treasure
hunt were not informed of the object of interest in the clues until the betting stage,
we see that the method would do reasonably well in aggregating information that the
soldiers were not paying particular attention to but which proves relevant later on.
There are many other situations that resemble the reconnaissance and the treasure
hunt enough that the methods discussed should be directly applicable:
1. Marine divers exploring underwater habitats, collecting information on the an-
imal species inhabiting a specific locations
2. Predicting the weather in an area - different people make different observations
that help them determine what the weather might be in future - bird migration
patterns, previous weather history etc. The people beliefs can be aggregated to
determine the likelihood of particular weather patterns in future. It is worth
noting that there are already online markets that trade in securities to predict
the weather (for instance http://www.theweathermarket.com), and the results
show that the prediction of the aggregation mechanisms used rival those made
by such markets.
3. etc.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis set out to investigate how sociometric information can be
used to improve the aggregation of dispersed information. We ran two parallel ex-
periment - the treasure hunt and the experiment described in [3] - with similar infor-
mation structures and from the reported perceived probabilities of different states of
an event, constructed and compared the predictions of different aggregation mecha-
nisms, explicating the role of social information in some cases (the public bets and
team structures) or ignoring such information in other cases. Our analysis led us to
a number of conclusions:
1. The experimental setup described in [3] is a good approximation of many real-
world situations, therefore the methods developed in [3] should yield reasonably
accurate results when aggregating information in these scenarios.
2. Incorporating more sociometric data into the aggregation mechanisms improves
the results significantly.
3. The data suggests that through the prices, the market communicates some social
information to the users, and by reacting to this information they affect the
prices in some way, therefore, the market also performs an aggregation that
includes sociometric data - albeit implicitly - in making its prediction.
7.1 Future Work
Based on the results of this work, we expect that social networks play a significant
role affecting information flow and aggregation. Therefore, it is prudent to investigate
further the role of social networks especially in the dissemination of information. The
events analyzed in this thesis were simple enough (draws from an urn, observations of
clues) and straight-foward enough that it was reasonable to expect that if two people
were exposed to the same information, it would affect their beliefs in the same way (in
our case, their belief of the distribution of states). However, there are many instances
where the effect of social network is not clear cut. Consider trying to predict the
probability of adoption of a set of products. If we restrict ourselves to one individual,
we expect that that individual's likelihood of adopting the product depends to some
extent on whether his/her friends have adopted the said product (social pressure).
A simple aggregation mechanism may suggest that the more of the person's friends
have the product, the more likely the person is to adopt the product (linear model).
However, it fails to account for some relevant attributes of the person or of their social
network that may result in highly non-linear behavior. For instance, an individual
may not adopt some product unless 20 of his/her classmates have adopted it, but
that number may go down to 1 if one of those classmates is also their best friend.
Many such examples exist, illustrating that different people are affected by their social
networks in different ways, depending on the attributes of the person, the network and
possible the prevailing environment. This suggests that while we adopted a somewhat
simplistic view of how social networks may affect information flow and aggregation,
the reality is more complicated. While it may be impossible to characterize a person's
social network in its entirety, future work might seek to come up with slightly more
sophisticated models of how social networks impact information flow, which should
increase our ability to control for these effects when aggregating information.
From our data, it is evident that the market performed rather well, despite being
rather thin (6 subjects per market run). We have several hypotheses for why this is so:
(1) each market session consisted of 7 call rounds lasting 120 seconds each, therefore
despite the thinness of the market, there were enough rounds for the probabilities to
settle closer to the truth; (2) the market is also implicitly including social information
in its aggregation as described in §5.2.3; (3) by starting off the market prices at a
uniform distribution, we may have already introduces a bias since the entropy of the
uniform distribution compared to the truth was not very high. Future work might
look further into this issue of market performance and possibly try to explicate the
role of sociometric information, the duration (length) of the market, etc.
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Appendix A
Tables
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Mean Variance
private 3.437 0.868 1.207 1.838 1.396
private/risk 2.299 0.556 1.239 1.365 0.879
private/risk/my public 0.516 0.006 0.476 0.333 0.2831
private/risk/group public 0.951 0.010 0.593 0.518 0.475
market 0.2102 0.0525 0.044 0.102 0.0937
Table A.1: Data for the entropy of the prediction due to the treasure hunt experiment
Session 4 Session 5 Session 6 Mean Variance
private 1.312 1.180 0.807 1.099 0.262
private/risk 0.820 1.265 0.712 0.932 0.293
private/risk/my public 0.252 0.524 0.556 0.444 0.167
private/risk/group public 0.458 0.340 0.533 0.444 0.097
market 0.198 0.120 0.008 0.109 0.095
Table A.2: Data for the entropy of the prediction of the Chen et. al. setup
Team 1A Team 1B Team 2A Team 2B Team 3A Team 3B Mean Variance
private 1.135 1.487 0.230 0.328 0.738 0.853 0.795 0.477
private/risk 1.025 0.677 0.055 0.241 1.007 0.353 0.560 0.407
private/risk/my public 0.491 0.100 0.090 0.020 0.840 0.558 0.350 0.329
private/risk/group public 0.920 0.088 0.096 0.021 0.915 0.745 .464 0.438
Table A.3: Entropy for treasure hunt divided according to team structure
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